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DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
When our ancestors shook off their allegiance to the British Crown
they already had a goodly estate of inheritance to which a new title
was then added by right of conquest. This heritage inclided our
English language and literature, our religious freedom, and the
common law of England. These noble possessions were not wrong-
fully or feloniously appropriated by the fathers of the republic from
the storehouse of our English forbear§; on the contrary, they were
native rights of the American patriots. The men who sat in just
judgment on Charles Stuart fled to New Haven and found a hiding
place in Judges' Cave. Cromwell himself was resolved to seek a
home in America, and only the accident of a sudden storm kept him
from setting sail. The armies of the parliamentary party swarmed
with men who fought and died for English liberty which they
bequeathed as a rich legacy to their offspring in America. Shakes-
peare, Milton and the King James Bible were the just possessions
of our fathers; religious liberty had been won by -their heroism;
and parliamentary government and the English common law were
their cherished birthright.
From the chamber of St. Stephen's at Westminster has gone out
the most momentous influence on human liberties that has ever had
its origin in a historic spot; and to Simon de Montfort, Earl of
Leicester, belongs the 'highest meed of praise for what the House
of Commons has accomplished in the cause of 'constitutional govern-
ment. One hundred legislative bodies in Great Britain and America,
and in the islands of the sea and the depths of dark continents where
English liberty has penetrated, are the proud monuments of the
genius of this liberty-loving hero.'
' The subject matter of positive law is human jurisprudence, defin-
itely enacted by legislative or judicial authority. LaW, as known tojurists, is that which is announced in and enforced by courts. Divine,
law and natural law under Whatever name, are outside the field ofjurisprudence, because they do not rest for their definition and
enforcement on tribunals of justice. Strictly speaking, divine law
and natural law find their authority apart from the executive depart-
x. Kilbourne v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 184.
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ment of political bodies. But positive law, formulated by man in
organized society, is susceptible to being ignored and disobeyed in
specific instances through human weakness and wickedness. This
disobedience is restrained by penalties, threatened and applied, called
sanctions. The machinery of courts exists for this purpose, to
compel obedience by the terror of threatened vengeance on wrong-
doers, and the specific enforcement of certain legal rights. The phil-
osophy of remedial justice, the books on court procedure, the
organization of tribunals, and the rules of practice,--all postulate the
definition of substantive rights and anticipate the necessity of their
vindication by executive authority. Were all mankind habitually
obedient to civic duty there would be little need of courts or lawyers.
Criminal tribunals would be perpetually in recess; grand juries
would be discharged on the opening day after some happy deliverance
on the virtues of the people; mortgages would be paid and not fore-
closed; estates would be partitioned by friendly deeds and releases
rather than after the trial of issues between kinsmen; commercial
paper would be honored at maturity and notaries would have nothing
to protest; taxes would be paid promptly when due, and land needed
for public use would be ceded voluntarily for a fair compensation.
The function of -the legislator, the judge and the advocate in a
Utopian society would differ little from that of a commentator on
civic duty and an exhotter of mankind to achieve a loftier standard
of ethics.
But progress has been through strife and collision. Wars have
built up empires. Slavery through brute force has established prin-
ciples of mastership and subordination. Competition has developed
mercantile usage which has received the approval of judges and
courts. Violence has compelled the enactment of repressive and
vindictive measures for the establishment of personal security. The
arrogance of patrician classes and the self-assertion of triumphant
warriors have compelled the masses to declare their liberties and
personal rights. Thus has the law progressed sometimes in the
unnoticed and painless way remarked by Savigny and Puchta; and
sometimes, as von Jhering observes, by a mighty struggle against
vested interests through legislation.
In all human societies law has been evolved partly through the
action of courts. Primitive jurisprudence is much concerned with
the red tape of procedure. The higher problems of philosophic
jurisprudence are solved only by the student who rises from the
humble details of practice to the loftier heights of juridical science.
The earliest codes deal largely with remedy. Jurisdiction, or the right
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to lay down the law, is of prime importance. Shall the suppliant
plaintiff apply for the redress of grievances and hale his enemy
before the King's justice or his chancellor? What process of judicial
coercion can be made available? Can defendant be arrested or his
property attached? By how many witnesses can the truth be es-
tablished? And can the party in interest himself be a witness?
When may trial by jury be demanded? And is there a right of
appeal? Moreover, who shall pay the costs? And what is trial by
one's peers?
The distinction between the substantive law, or law of primary
rights, on the one hand, and the adjective law, or law of remedial
justice, on the other, is not easily made. All law, properly so called,
must have accompanying it a remedial right, by which its enforce-
ment can be secured; otherwise it becomes a moral precept, or a
mere brutunt fulmen, a dead letter. If all efficient legal remedies
for enforcing a contract are withdrawn or disappear, then the obliga-
tion -of such contract is impaired. This the legislature may not do.
But if a single substantial and efficacious remedy remains, or is
offered by the law, such obligation is not impaired.' Remedy fur-
nishes a large chapter in the book of law. It comprehends the
organization and jurisdiction of courts, including courts of appeal,
the summons and other process for compelling the appearance of
defendants, various provisional remedies, such as attachment, injunc-
tion and receivership, and the final process of execution and sale, the
rules of pleading or scientific allegation of causes of action and
defences, the limitations of time for commencing civil actions before
they are outlawed, so to speak; the rules of evidence, or the method
and means of proof, and the statutory category or class of cases
where written proof may be required.
No one doubts that, in pursuance of due process of law, courts can
be abolished and their litigants sent to other tribunals of justice; that
the right of appeal can be limited or taken wholly away; that arrest
for debt, either as a provisional or final remedy, can be abolished;
that property of a debtor can be exempted from execution on a
judgment; that the statute of limitations may be changed and the
time allowed by law for bringing an action may be shortened,' and
that the statute of frauds may be extended, and written testimony
demanded where oral proof has heretofore been deemed sufficient.
It requires but small powers of imagination to see that in any one of
these details, trifling as they seem when viewed generally, there lies
2. Oshkosh Waterworks Co. v. Oshkosh, 187 U. S. 437.
3. Cainfb'll v. Holt, xr5 U. S. 620.
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the whole matter of substantial enforcement of a specific legal right.
A friendly and humane judge leaves the bench at the end of the ap-
pointed term of court and a capricious and obstinate man takes his
place; this may determine the result of a particular suit. A certain
party may be a desirable tenant while distress for rent lingers in the
law, and most undesirable when that historic remedy is abolished.
A vendee in bad faith may be held in check by garnishment or some
form of attachment or trustee process, while on the denial of these
remedies he may become bold and rampant in schemes of fraud and
spoliation. Manly obligation, honestly assumed, may be repudiated
by one who has not written it in black and white in any instance
where the statute requires a writing. Rules of evidence may be
changed, and witnesses, who have full knowledge of the truth, may
be judicially silenced, and the plaintiff, on whom rests the burden
of proof, crippled in the establishment of his cause of action.' The
privilege of having the assistance of counsel, learned in the law, may
always be refused to a mere witness, and has often been denied to a
party to the record himself.
And this is as it should be. Who can say that society should not
make progress, and that legal procedure should not keep step with
the general advance? Who has any vested right in the law remain-
ing as it is, unamended and unimproved? No progressive commun-
ity has ever asserted such a reactionary doctrine.'
"Rights of property, which have been created by the common law,
cannot be taken away without due process; but the law itself, as a
rule of conduct may be changed at will, or even at the whim of the
legislature, unless prevented by constitutional limitations."' No
man bringing a suit gets a vested right to a certain decision; for the
lay may be amended or repealed during the pendency of the action
or pending an appeal and before final judgment, and the case is to be
ultimately determined by the law as it stands at that tine.? Nor has
any citizen a vested right in the continuance of statutory privileges
and exemptions, such as personal exemptions from military or jury
duty, and the exemption of property from taxation and execution.
The phrase "due process of law" is derived from Magna Charta,
from that famous sentence in the thirty-ninth chapter, in barbarous
mediaeval Latin, which has been pronounced by eminent authority
4. Ogden v. Saunders. 12 Wheat. 213.
5 Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 385; Oshkosh Waterworks Co. v. Osh-
kosh, 187 U. S. 437.
6. Mfunn v. Illinois, 9 4 U. S. 113.
7. Hartung v. Peo.6le, 22 N. Y. 95.
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as worth more to mankind than all the Greek and Roman classics
and "which alone," says Blackstone, "would have merited the title
that it bears of The Great Charter": "No freemen shall be taken,
or imprisoned, or disseized, or outlawed,* or banished, or in anywise
destroyed; nor will the king pass upon him, or commit him to prison,
save by the lawful judgment of his peers, or the law of the land."*
"By the law of the land," says Webster, in the Dartmouth College
case, "is most clearly intended the general law; a law which hears
before it condemns; which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judg-
ment only after trial."' In Murray v. Hoboken Land Co.1 Mr.
Justice Curtis says: "The words 'due process of law' were un-
doubtedly intended to convey the same meaning as the words 'by the
law of the land' in Magna Charta. Lord Coke, in his commentary
on those words ' says they mean due process of law." The phrase is
found in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States which provides that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law"; and again in the Four-
teenth Amendment, which says: "Nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty or property without due process of law." It
had been held that the object of the Fifth Amendment was only to
protect the citizen against the encroachments of the Federal govern-
ment.'
Judge Cooley has shown that in some form of words the guaranty
of protection by the law of the land is to be found in all of the State
constitutions.' The Northwest Ordinance also used the words "but
by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land." The legal
import of the phrase due process of law is the same in both the
Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments. The Federal authority will
not interfere with the settled laws of a State applicable to all persons
in like circumstances and conditions, except where there is some
abuse of law amounting to confiscation of property, or deprivation of
personal rights."
Magna Charta was evidently designed, according to the United
States Supreme court, to secure the individual from the arbitrary
8. 4 Bl. Comm. 244.
q. Webster's Works, V. 487; Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4
Wheat. 419.
1o. iS How. 272.
11. 2 Inst. 50.
12. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U. S. 243; Caghitol City Dairy Co. v. Ohio,
183 U. S. 238; Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 172.
13. Constitutional Limitations, 429.
14. French v. Paving Co., 1S U. S. 324.
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exercise of the powers of the government.' "This document," say
Pollock and Maitland, "becomes a sacred text, the nearest approach
to an irripealable fundamental statute that England ever had. In
brief, it means that the Kiig is and shall be below the law." This
high authority continues: "It has been possible for men to worship
the words nisi per legale judiciffm parium suorum vel per legem
terrae, because it was possible to misunderstand them. . . . It is
now generally admitted that the phrase judicium parium does not
-point to trial by jury. (Stubbs Constl. Hist. of Eng. Vol. I, 578;
Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 9o0.) . . . This clause expresses
a claim by the barons for a tribunal of men of baronial rank which
shall try even civil causes in which barons are concerned.
In the most famous words of the charter we may detect a feudal
claim which will only cease to be dangerous when in course of time
men have distorted their meaning. A man is entitled to the judg-
ment of his peers; and the King's justices are no peers for earls
and barons." 
Formulated in England to protect the feudal baron against the
tyranny of the King, this clause became in America the bulwark of
defence for the humblest citizen against the legislative power. It is
therefore much more powerful here than in the mother country for
Parliament is unrestrained by an organic law, whereas under the
decision in Marbury v. Madison,' every department of our govern-
ment is subject to constitutional liinitations. True liberty has an
inherent power of growth and expansion. The Fourteenth Amend-
ment itself was once conceived by the Supreme court as designed
solely to protect the colored race." Roscoe Conkling argued against
this narrow view and produced in court the journal of the reconstruc-
tion Congress which drafted the amendment to show its broad scope.
There was a powerful dissent in the Slaughter House Cases from the
opinion of the court; and some of the views of the dissentient
minority are now the law of the land. Not one case in twenty that
are now adjudicated under this amendment concerns the negro in
any way. The last three amendmepts, in the language of Justice
Swayne, in the Slaughter House Cases, "may be said to rise to-the
dignity of a new Magna Charta." A bro~d view is now taken of-
them as great and far-reaching provisions in protection of individual
i5. Bank of Columbia v'. Okeley. 4 Wheat. 235.
x6. Hist. of Eng. Corn. Law, Vol. i, p. 173.
17. 5 U. S. X37.
18. The Slaughter House Cases, 83 U. S. 36; Strauder v. Virginia,
zoo U. S. 303.
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liberty against governmental oppression and spoliation." Ex-Chief
Judge Parker, of the New York Court of Appeals, in an elaborate
discussion of this theme, shows the application of this constitutional
test to legislation affecting police powers, eminent domain, taxation
and procedure.1
"Due process of law," says Justice Curtis, "generally includes
actor, reus, judex, regular allegations, opportunity to answer, and a
trial according to some settled course of judicial pro&edings." Yet
this is not universally true; and, in the case under discussion, the
court sustained a distress-warrant, without any such trial. This
distress-warrant was a summary remedy for the collection of public
dues, process, in its nature, final, which issued against the body, lands
and goods of certain debtors to the public treasury.' Judge Story
says: "When life and liberty are in question there must, in every
instance, be judicial proceedings; and that requirement implies an
accusation, a hearing before an impartial tribunal with proper juris-
diction, and a conviction and judgment before the punishment can be
inflicted." '
But the constitution does not describe the processes which it intends
to demand or exclude. It does not even indicate what principles are
to be followed in order to determine whether any given process be
due. Clearly it is not left to Congress to do its own liking; for the
organic law is a restraint on Congress. When any particular process
is challenged for unconstitutionality we have not only to examine the
Constitution itself to see if there be any direct conflict, but in addition
we must examine the settled modes of judicial procedure in England
before the emigration of our ancestors and note those that were put
in operation here as suited to our politcal and civil conditions. But
England was the home of the Star-Chamber Court, sitting at one
end of Westminster Hall, and proceding to judgment by arbitrary
authority instead of according to the common law. This court has
given its name, once honorable (whether derived from the gilded
stars in the roof of the temple or from the deposit there of Jewish
bonds called stars, as Blackstone tells us) as a by-word and reproach
to all tribunals that substitute for orderly procedure the secret and
unfair methods of despotic authority. Surely, as we have no King,
so we will have none of this.
19. Yick Wo v. Hofihins, 118 U. S. 356.
20. American Law Review, December z9o3 and January 19o4.
21. Murray v. Hoboken Land Co., z8 How. 272; Palmer v. McMahon,
133 U. S. 66o.
22. Story on the Const., 1943.
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The Constitution does not control the form of procedure, if the
method adopted gives reasonable notice and affords a fair oppor-
tunity to be heard.'
The right to appeal cannot be demanded as essential to due process
of law.' And a statutory right to take an appeal may be taken away,
even as to matters already pending in the appellate court.' A State
can arrange and parcel out the jurisdiction of. its several courts at
its discretion and can deny to certain suitors the right of appeal and
of writs of error." In England, in cases of murder, the court of first
instance is the court of last resort; and, in case of conviction, the
prisoner's only appeal is to the clemency of the King, which his
majesty exercises on the advice of the home secretary.
Mr. justice Matthews said in Hurtado v. Califonnia:? "Any
legal proceeding, enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by
age or custom, or newly devised, in pursuance of the general public
good, which regards and preserves the principles of liberty and
justice, must be held to be due process of law." It was accordingly
held that the State is not tied down to the practice and procedure at
common law, and that the grand jury system may be abolished, and
the prosecution of crimes by indictment discontinued.' A State
has the right to alter the common law at any time.' The State of
New York might adopt the civil law? A trial by jury in suits at
common law pending in the State courts is not a privilege or im-
munity of national citizenship which the States are forbidden by the
Fourteenth Amendment to abridge.?
Courts of equity are always open to afford a remedy where there
is an attempt, under the guise of legal proceedings, to deprive a per-
son of his life, liberty or property without due process of law?
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not
control mere forms of procedure in State courts, or regulate practice
therein; and all its requirements are complied with, provided that in
23. Railroad v. Iowa, 16o U. S. 389; Water Confany v. Brooklyn, 166
U. S. 685; Hooker v. Los Angeles, i88 U. S. 314.
24. .Reetz v. Michigan, i88 U. S. 505.
25. Exfiarte McCardle, 7 Wall. 5o6.
26. Missouri v. Lewis, xo U. S. 22.
27. x1o U. S. 516.
28. Thomfison v. Utah, 170 U. S. 349.
29. West v. Louisiana, 194 U. S. 258.
30. Missouriv. Lewis. 1ox U. S. 22.
31. Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. go; Hodgson v. Vermont, x68 U. S. 262.
32. French v. Barber Ashhalt Co.. x8 U. S. 345.
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the proceedings the person condemned had sufficient notice and
adequate opportunity to defend.'
Due process of law, prescribed by the Fourteenth Amendment,
requires compensation to be made to the owner when private property
is taken for public use." Ordinarily notice to the owner and oppor-
tunity to defend must be given.' Whenever necessary for the pro-
tection of the parties the law must give them an opportunity to be
heard.' Notice to owners of land liable to be assessed for a public
improvement need not be given." And property may be taken for
public use prior to any payment.'
Exactly what due process of law requires in the collection of
general taxes has never yet been decided by the Supreme court.
While notice is required in condemnation proceedings, it has been
held that no notice is necessary for the collection of general taxes."
Notice to a taxpayer need not be personal. ' The owner need. not
have an opportunity to be present when the tax is assessed. '  Due
process of law is afforded to a taxpayer if he is given an opportunity
to be heard before the assessors.0 And perfectly legal notice may be
given by simple publication, as in case of a municipal ordinance
distributing th6 cost of a sewer."
The prompt payment of taxes is important to the public welfare.
The individual taxpayer is not entitled to the delays of litigation. If
the tax laws are harsh the remedy is with the legislature and not
with the judicial branch of the government" So, where -the city of
New Orleans drained swamp lands and assessed the real estate
benefited thereby, it was held that the Federal Constitution did not
control the State authorities although excessive prices were allowed
and unequal assessments levied.'
Among other interesting adjudications showing the range and
33. Railroad v. Schmidt, 177 U. S. 230; Iowa Central R. R. v. Iowa, i6o
U. S.-389; Wilson v. North Carolina, z69 U. S. 586.
34. Railroad v. Chicag, x66 U. S. 226; L. . Water Co. v. Brooklyn,
x661 U. S. 685.
35. Sjoencer v. Marchant, 125 U.S. 345; Paulsen v. Portland, 149 U.S. 3o-
36. Turfiin v. Lemon, 187 U. S. 58.
37. Goodrich v.. Detroit, 184 U. S. 432.
38. Williams v. Parker, x88 U. S. 491.
39. Hagar v. Reclamation District, II U. S. 701.
4o. Glidden v.. Harrington, 189 U. S. 255.
41. McMillan v, Anderson, 95 U. S. 37.
42. Hibben v. Smith, x9" U. S. 3O.
43. Paulsen v. Portland, z49 U. S. 40.
44. Sfiringer v. U. S., 102 U. S. 586.
45. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97.
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variety of the decisions under this clause of the Constitution we note
that aliens may be deported and anarchists excluded from the
country;"' that mail matter may be seized by the postmaster-general
under a fraud order, without invoking the aid of the courts;" that the
sale of liquor may be regulated by a local option law, and the penalty
for illegal selling may be left to the discretion of the court; " that a
State statute may require the erection of a railway station;" that
women may be excluded from saloons licensed to sell liquor;" that
the hours of work in laundries may be regulated; " that the conduct
of a grain elevator may be placed under State regulation;" that the
right to continue the practice of the learned professions is property
which cannot be arbitrarily taken away;" that State laws may pro-
hibit the intermarriage of white and blacks;" that separate schools
may be impartially provided for whites and blacks;" that a health
officer may be empowered to kill a diseased beast;" and that de-
bauched women who are being imported into the State for immoral
purposes may be excluded."
No man ought to be judge in his own cause, and close relationship
to plaintiff or defendant should disqualify him for the exercise of
judicial functions. So, if the estate of the judge will be affected by
his ruling, he should not sit"' By statute in many States interest
arising from holding corporate stock or from being a taxpayer no
longer works a judicial disqualification.
Distinguished jurists have taken time to analyze the proceedings in
the trial of Jesus, according to the gospel narrative, and fo exhibit
their turbulent and disorderly character. Mr. Justice Gaynor and
Mr. Justice Hatch, of the New York Supreme Court, have written
eloquently and learnedly on this theme. It seems that political
authority and the power of judicial condemnation in capital cases
were with the Roman governor of Judaea. And so the Apostles'
46. Turner v. Williams, 194 U. S. 279.
47. Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497.
48. Lloyd v. .Dollison, r94 U. S. 445.
49. Railroad v. Minnesota, r93 U. S. 53.
So. Cronin v. Adams, X92 U. S. 1O8.
5!. Barbiervi. Connolly, 1X3 U. S. 27.
52. Munn V. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113.
53. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 11 4.
54. State 'v. ackson, 8o Mo. 175.
5s. Peofile v. Gallagher, 93 N. Y. 438.
56. Newark &- S. 0. Co. v'. Hunt, So N. J. L. 308.
57. Matter of Ah Foo, 49 Cal. 403.
58. Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal, 3 H. of L. Cases 759.
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Creed speaks fairly of Christ as having "suffered under Pontius
Pilate," not only in the time of Pilate and in the period of his pro-
consulship, which is doubtless all that was intended by this language,
but actually under his jurisdiction, which was the substantial truth in
the case. However, it has been thought necessary to charge the
conviction and execution of the Man of Nazareth to the Jews, who
arraigned him in the court of the high priests, before Annas and
Caiphas, and judged him according to Jewish law. In the course
of this prosecution careful observers have noticed the indecent haste
with which execution was ordered, and the indifference displayed by
the judges to the formalities of just procedure, prescribed by the
Mosaic jurisprudence. Thus, in addition to the false testimony
adduced on the trial, and the shifting of the charge against the
accused from blasphemy to treason, we note that the trial before
the high priest was held in the night-time, contrary to the penta-
teuchal code, and that the truth of the charges was not established
beyond a reasonable doubt.
A member cannot be expelled" from a voluntary unincorporated
association without notice and opportunity to be heard." Failure to
appear will not authorize expulsion without proof; and failure to
serve copies of charges, as required by the by-laws, is a jurisdictional
defect." In the case of membership associations an action cannot be
maintained to correct errors or illegal acts in the course of their gov-
ernment and administration till the remedies provided by the con-
stitution and by-laws have been exhausted.' The wide application of
these principles is commended in an English case of great authority
where the Court said: "No man shall be condemned to consequences
resulting from alleged misconduct, unheard, and without having the
opportunity of making his defence. This rule is not confined to the
conduct of strictly legal tribunals, but is applicable to every tribunal
or body of persons invested with authority to adjudicate upon matters
involving civil consequences to individuals.""
Isaac Franklin Russel,,
59. Loubat v. LeRoy, 4o Hun 546.
6o. Peohle ex rel Deverell v. Protective Union, ux8 N. Y. ior.
6z. La Fond v. Deems, 81 N. Y. 507.
62. Wood v. Wood, L. R. 9 Ex. zgo.
